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1. Introduction
Hungarian-Russian relations have changed considerably during the last decade. In the mid-2000s, 
it was a  limited and cautious relationship with many reservations on both sides. Being a “friend of 
(in those years much less authoritarian) Russia” was often perceived as something exceptional and 
was predominantly a radical leftist phenomenon in the public discourse. The political class was united 
in banning Russian investments from Hungarian strategic industries. Returning to Eastern markets 
seemed to be an old-fashioned leftist concept heavily criticised by conservative thinkers. 
 By 2014, however, Hungary had a significantly different outline of its Russia policy. By far the 
biggest component in this change was Viktor Orbán and his conservative followers giving up their res-
ervations and objections against Russia. Policies and public appearances by senior officials and party 
leaders, approaching Russia both in economic terms and sometimes politically, demonstrate a radical 
shift in attitudes and preferences. All this, coupled with a highly controversial record of political devel-
opments in Hungary, leaves foreign observers at odds as to the nature, dynamics and trajectory of this 
bilateral relationship.
 This chapter has two purposes. It attempts to provide an overview of bilateral economic ties includ-
ing more recent developments. It also outlines an alternative to the Russian agenda in one of the most 
important linkages – energy. Finally, it endeavours to promote a better understanding of Hungary’s 
motivations in its Russia policy.
2. Just like in CEE – a limited relationship with a focus  
on foreign trade
For the Hungarian economy, the relevance of the Russian and Ukrainian markets – except energy 
– is relatively limited. In 2013, Russia’s and Ukraine’s shares of Hungary’s total exports were 
3.11% and 2.39%, respectively. Even with these low proportions, these export destinations rank 
among Hungary’s largest export markets outside the EU. Exports in both cases grew steadily 
prior to the 2008 crisis, primarily in the machinery and manufactured industry segments. This is 
a strong indication of the increasing role of multinational companies in bilateral trade relations. 
Parallel to EU-Russia and EU-Ukraine economic trends, Hungarian exports practically stagnated 
after the crisis and fell in 2014–2015. As in some Western countries, euphoria about the post-
Soviet markets was gone by 2013, and most economic groups have pursued a cautious strategy in 
the 2010s.
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Graph 1. Hungarian exports to Russia, mln EUR
Source: Stadat, Hungarian Statistical Office 
Imports from Russia and Ukraine constituted 8.55% and 1.65% of the total in 2013, respectively. As 
statistical data demonstrate, energy constitutes an almost exclusive share of imports, especially in the 
case of Russia. It is worth noting that growth in energy imports can be attributed almost exclusively 
to the price effect: imported quantities increased only modestly prior to the 2008 economic crisis and 
have dropped substantially in the last couple of years. 
 Exports have decreased significantly since hostilities began in early 2014. Hungarian exports 
to Russia dropped by double-digits both in 2014 and in the first quarter of 2015. There is no reli-
able information about the particular role of different kinds of sanctions, but exchange rate volatility 
and declining consumption in Ukraine and Russia have certainly had a major impact. In the case of 
Ukraine, Hungarian exports stalled much earlier and after 2008 never fully returned to their pre-crisis 
levels. Thus, the war and economic slowdown have had a slightly smaller statistical impact in the years 
since 2013.
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Graph 2. Hungarian imports from Russia, mln EUR
Source: Stadat, Hungarian Statistical Office
 
Graph 3. Hungarian exports to Russia and Ukraine in Q1s, mln EUR
Source: Stadat, Hungarian Statistical Office
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3. The vital, the visible and the minor – energy, trade  
and investment relations with Russia
As demonstrated above, the backbone of Hungary’s bilateral relations both with Russia and Ukraine 
is trade. In the case of Russia, energy constitutes the dominant share of imports. Oil and oil products 
are traditionally imported from Russia by MOL, a domestic company in Hungarian private ownership 
(although the state also has a 24.7% share). Oil trading is relatively competitive, alternative supply 
routes are accessible, and no disputes have been reported except for some disturbances surrounding 
Ukrainian transit. 
 Natural gas imports present a bigger concern both in terms of supply and transit security, and in 
terms of prices. The 2009 Russian-Ukrainian gas dispute revealed Hungary’s vulnerability and the 
limits of its network’s resilience. High natural gas prices have also put considerable stress on social 
relations through utility prices in the last couple of years. The Orbán government purchased the whole-
saler company holding the main long-term import contract (LTC) from E.ON in 2013. Thus, relations 
and negotiations about LTC conditions (price and pricing, take-over obligations, flexibilities, etc.) have 
become more politicised recently. Even if formally the LTC is held by state-owned company MVM, 
negotiations are held at the highest levels, often between Viktor Orbán and Vladimir Putin or Alexey 
Miller. 
 Nuclear issues are manifold – Russia is a key supplier of the fuel for the existing four Soviet-built 
VVER blocks at Paks, and Rosatom is a  contractor in the current life-extension programme for 
these units. In parallel, the Orbán cabinet contracted two new blocks with Rosatom in 2014, for the 
construction of which Russia has also provided a EUR 10 billion credit line. The two new units are 
expected to be commissioned in 2025 and 2026 with roughly the same overall capacity as the four 
old blocks (2 à 1200 MW vs. 4 à 500 MW). The four old blocks will be phased out between 2032 and 
2037.
 Exports consist predominantly of manufactured goods and machinery. According to estimates, 
more than 65% of exports come from local subsidiaries of multinational companies. These outlets 
benchmark their exports according to their corporate strategy and market relations. Competitiveness 
is the dominant driver in these segments, and consequently bilateral relations and political decision-
making have a limited role here. This is important, since the Hungarian government has an exclusively 
utilitarian approach to foreign policy, with Eastern export markets in its spotlight. Despite these ambi-
tions, the government has little influence on this “multinational segment” of exports. Nonetheless, the 
decline in exports in some of these areas may have macroeconomic relevance. Although neither Audi 
nor Mercedes provide data about their exports, the Hungarian assembly lines supposedly have some 
relation to Russian and Ukrainian markets (these may even bypass Hungarian-Russian statistics if 
components are delivered to other EU countries for assembly).
 There is not full clarity about the structure and nature of exports managed by domestic (Hun-
garian-owned) firms. Pharmaceutical companies (Richter and EGIS) are the most exposed to CIS 
markets, with almost half of their revenues coming from the region. In the case of Richter, 33% of 
sales were realised in Russia in 2013, with another 7% in Ukraine and 7% in the other CIS countries 
(Richter Gedeon…, 2014, p. 45). Agricultural exports are overrepresented in the public discourse, 
especially relative to their low statistical share (below 5% of the total). Nevertheless, certain influ-
ential groups and domestic tycoons have considerable interests in agricultural exports to Russia (e.g. 
Sándor Csányi).
 In terms of investments, Hungary has relatively little exposure to Ukraine and Russia. The coun-
try’s largest bank, OTP, placed CIS markets at the centre of its expansion strategy in the mid-2000s. 
Currently, Russia and Ukraine constitute the bank’s third- and fourth-largest markets in terms of 
financial assets, respectively. This may be cause for headaches if the situation in the region worsens. 
For MOL, Russia had lost much of its significance by the end of the 2000s. Even though Russian assets 
have historically played a major role in forming the company’s upstream portfolio, today MOL has 
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a more diversified pool of production. Certain other, smaller tycoons have relatively small investments 
in Russia, predominantly related to construction or other services. Thus, Hungary’s overall exposure 
in investments is not at a critical level, perhaps with the limited exception of OTP.
4. Business relations without businessmen – politics  
take the lead
It would be difficult to identify a “Russia lobby” in bilateral relations. This is partly due to the limited 
significance of the Russian economy for Hungary and the lack of transparency in economic ties. Never-
theless, the government currently appears to be a more determined advocate of strengthening business 
ties than any other major corporate group. In the latter’s strategies, economic realities, conventional 
business risks and uncertainties about prospects have downgraded Russia relatively rapidly of late. 
OTP had heavy losses in both its Ukrainian and Russian portfolios, while Richter and other major 
exporters are following a  “wait and see” policy. Thus, even though these corporate interests may 
function as a buffer against deteriorating bilateral relations, they definitely fall short of explaining the 
current good relations on the political level. Today, normal business and corporate relations do not play 
a leading role in Hungary’s Russia policy; political leadership is undisputed.
 Fidesz has made a political U-turn in its relations with Russia over the last couple of years. Vik-
tor Orbán, a staunch critic of Russia for two decades, has turned into one of Moscow’s most vocal 
defenders in the midst of its war in Eastern Ukraine. Orbán, who characterised Hungary as the “hap-
piest barrack of Gazprom” in 2008, has concluded a huge nuclear deal with Rosatom and continues 
to pursue the most intensive negotiations with Gazprom since the fall of Communism. What is more, 
Orbán’s supporters have followed him through this transformation: today, Fidesz is a Central Euro-
pean conservative party whose voters are the most pro-Russian in the Hungarian political landscape 
(A magyarok többsége…, 2015). Moreover, right-wing radical party Jobbik, Hungary’s second-
strongest party according to opinion polls, has criticised the government’s pro-European stance and 
favours even more engagement with Moscow – a historically unprecedented and totally unconventional 
orientation for a radical right-wing party in Hungary.
 The economic component in this strange transformation is difficult to grasp, but supposedly it 
played a major role. Economic considerations as such play a vital role in Fidesz’s foreign policy. After 
his landslide electoral victory in 2014, Orbán delivered this new directive at the annual ambassadors’ 
meeting with the rather blunt observation that “ideology-oriented foreign policy was invented by 
smart countries for foolish ones”. Hungary’s foreign missions were instructed to place greater empha-
sis on increasing Hungarian exports and investments, since “we live in an economic world” (Orbán: 
Sunnyogással…, 2014). Given widespread government corruption and the cabinet’s almost exclusive 
affinity for economic considerations in foreign policy, Orbán’s turn towards Russia must have had 
a strong economic justification. Energy is certainly a major issue in this regard. Both the 2014 Paks 
expansion agreement and Gazprom’s parallel concessions in the Russian gas LTC signal that the two 
countries have strong quid pro quo relations. Corruption may play a role as well. In this regard, there is 
widespread speculation about the MET gas trading company’s relations both to Gazprom and perhaps 
even to Viktor Orbán personally or to certain agricultural export channels (A legtöbb pénzt…, 2015; 
További Magyar…, 2014).
 Given this murky background, it is difficult to measure the magnitude of bilateral relations and 
their future. At this moment, it very much seems that Hungarian-Russian relations do not constitute 
a  “love affair”, but rather a  business relationship on the political level. Furthermore, much of the 
potential benefits seem to have already been collected by the Hungarian side. In this regard, there is 
a certain chance that if Moscow does not offer more, Fidesz will rebalance its foreign policy and give 
in to suspected US and Western pressure. These rebalancing attempts were relatively obvious during 
the first half of 2015 after Putin’s visit to Budapest in February. Nonetheless, many issues in bilateral 
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relations remain unresolved, paving the way for some “hard talk” between the sides in the foresee-
able future. Politically motivated business relations are always shaky, and this may also be the case 
between Hungary and Russia.
5. More noise than damage from sanctions
It is difficult to measure the impacts of sanctions on Hungarian-Russian relations. It is practically 
impossible to separate their implications from those of Russia’s declining economic trajectory and 
worsening trade and investment ties. The direct impacts are negligible: Hungary does not have arms, 
oil or gas drilling machinery exports to Russia, and Russian financial organisations and companies 
do not take out loans in Hungary. Russian sanctions on agricultural exports may have a bigger direct 
effect, however: according to the government, Hungarian producers are losing EUR 80 million annu-
ally due to countersanctions (Nyolcvanmillió euró…, 2014). This constitutes roughly 0.08% of Hun-
gary’s GDP, and Budapest has requested compensation from the EU.
 Indirect effects and implications from the Russian economic downturn may be more significant. 
Given the limited scope of foreign trade, its overall impact could hardly exceed 0.3% of Hungary’s 
GDP, and is presumably much less.63 Exporters are reportedly mainly suffering from the effects of the 
exchange rate: pharmaceutical firms, car producers, and agricultural exporters (in the non-sanctioned 
segments) have been affected most. For OTP, whose Russian branches focused on rouble credits in the 
retail sector, the increase in the CBR’s interest rates may cause difficulties. However, since the Russian 
economy is showing early signs of recovery from the initial panic, exchange rate volatility and interest 
rates have been decreasing, and some normalisation is expected during 2015.
 Except for some agricultural producers, companies have not asked for help from the government, 
which has harshly criticised the sanctions; Viktor Orbán characterised them as “shooting ourselves in 
the foot” (Orbán: Lábon…, 2014). There is not too much differentiation between Western sanctions 
against Russia and Russian countersanctions. According to the cabinet, sanctions are harmful for 
European economies and are not bringing about results, and the conflict can only be resolved through 
negotiations. Nevertheless, Orbán has not threatened to veto EU or NATO decisions, and his critical 
remarks have remained only rhetorical thus far.
6. At centre stage again: Russian energy
Hungary’s energy dependence on Russia in the past decade was characterised by controversial trends. 
In terms of volumes, imports have been decreasing rather rapidly, mainly due to a  sharp drop in 
domestic gas consumption.64 At the same time, however, Hungary pays roughly the same import bill 
for these decreased imports in value terms due to the rise in oil prices. As a result, it is fair to say that 
despite remarkable improvements in Hungarian energy security since the 2009 gas crisis, the domestic 
perception of Russian dependence has not changed too much. For many policy-makers and political 
actors, Russia remains the dominant supplier and Moscow has a strong mandate for negotiations on 
most energy-related questions.
63 There are no official or public statistics on this, and this figure is an estimate collected by the author from macroeconomic 
analysts working with Hungarian data on a continuous basis.
64 Gas consumption fell from its peak of over 13 bcm in 2006 to below 8 bcm in 2014.
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Graph 4. Hungarian gas and oil imports
Source: MAVIR
It is important to note that the energy supply situation has improved in a single major respect since 
the January 2009 Russian-Ukrainian gas price debate: accessibility to Western European markets has 
been greatly enhanced. This includes better interconnectivity with Western European hubs and within 
the region, the emergence of liquid hubs throughout the continent, and their impacts on contractual 
relations. In the Hungarian case, thanks to the pipelines with Baumgarten and the Slovak-Hungarian 
interconnector, the country complies with the N-1 rule and possesses sufficient border capacity to 
import gas from other sources if the Ukrainian pipeline is disrupted. Most of these achievements are 
lasting and point towards greater cohesion and consistency between Western and Central European 
markets. Coupled with some less visible trends, such as an emerging single electricity market and 
sharply decreasing domestic gas consumption, the context of Russian supply dominance has been 
changing. Direct Russian gas imports have practically halved, mainly due to decreased demand, but 
also due to more imports from Western hubs.
 Despite all these policy and market improvements, Budapest and Moscow continue to engage in 
separate and non-transparent energy talks. Independently from the diminished relevance of Russian 
long-term gas contracts and the more articulated European stance on competition issues, Russia 
still has the potential to shape regional energy relations and probably to bias European policies on 
a broader range of issues.
 The reasons are manifold. First, Russian energy remains the cheapest source for Hungary. West-
ern and maritime imports are increasingly accessible, but not competitive with Russian oil or natural 
gas. Local hubs (Baumgarten) offer lower prices, but their liquidity is low. Imports from Western 
European hubs (primarily TTF in the Netherlands) lose their price advantage due to long transit routes 
across the continent. LNG imports have been facilitated in some CEE states (Poland, Lithuania), but 
there is a premium: LNG costs more than Russian gas, so it is highly unlikely that Hungary would opt 
for such an investment. What is more, there is no credible plan to change this situation. Unlike the 
period between 2008 and 2012, when the V4 countries had a credible agenda and Hungary was hoping 
for cheaper LNG, Azeri imports through Nabucco-West and new patterns of regional trade, today no 
major new developments are on the horizon. The European and regional agenda has lost much of its 
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attractiveness. The policy-makers are enjoying the benefits of these achievements, but it is very tempt-
ing to look to Moscow for more rather than to Brussels.
 Second, the transition from bilateral LTCs to hub-based, high-frequency gas markets is a very long 
one. Since 2009, these contractual relations have been renegotiated incessantly. Even if Gazprom has 
to make concessions, this bargaining process also opens up opportunities for Moscow to differentiate 
between national partners. Even if there is a chance that these practices will disappear over time, 
the scope for bilateral bargaining is currently much broader than a decade ago. It is not always about 
price. Often take-over obligations (TOPs) and flexibility clauses are at least as important as prices or 
pricing. It is too early to write off gas contracts as a potential means for influencing national policies 
inside the EU and in Hungary in particular.
 Nevertheless, the most important change in Hungary is the shift from considerations of energy 
security towards those of social affordability. Oil and gas prices have multiplied during the last decade 
and have remained at an unprecedentedly high level since 2010. This is not only a current account 
problem, but also sets the issue of energy prices higher on the domestic agenda. Despite all efforts to 
keep consumer prices for natural gas and electricity at lower levels, according to Eurostat the share 
of Visegrad utility costs ranged from 7.3% (Hungary, after introducing a ban on gas and electricity 
price increases for households in 2010) to 11.3% (Slovakia) of final household consumption in 2012 
(Eurostat – Annual national accounts). This is almost double the proportions in Western Europe. Prior 
to the crisis, more than 70% of Hungarian households used natural gas as the primary fuel for space 
heating. Not surprisingly, utility prices are among the top issues of concern by the population. All of 
these social affordability considerations have resulted in more active political involvement on policy 
issues, a major, politically driven regulatory squeeze on the profitability of the utility sector, and rena-
tionalisation at the corporate level.
 Fidesz introduced a moratorium on raising gas and electricity prices right after its electoral vic-
tory in 2010 (DG Energy…, 2014). This proved painful for corporate stakeholders especially in the 
gas segment, since import price levels have increased by more than 25% in subsequent years. The 
regulator has kept the different cost items in line with the moratorium. In 2013, Fidesz launched 
a major utility rate cut campaign, further decreasing consumer prices by more than 25% in the follow-
ing year and a half. This was Orbán’s silver bullet in his 2014 electoral campaign, a cornerstone of his 
second landslide electoral victory. A populist taboo has thus been established with respect to utility 
prices, especially as far as gas and electricity are concerned. At the same time, significant losses have 
emerged in the gas sector value chain, which continue to cause longstanding financial tensions. EU 
regulations leave little room for subsidies, thus threatening the long-term financial sustainability of 
Hungary’s current price regime.65
 Unlike energy security, which is more EU-related, social affordability is still perceived by most 
of the policy stakeholders as a bilateral issue with the dominant supplier. This is a major window of 
opportunity for external suppliers, namely Russia. Russian export price concessions constitute a major 
tool to help to sustain these populist energy price policies. Gazprom provided a significant set of con-
cessions in the LTC right after the renationalisation of the wholesaler company between October 2013 
and March 2014. Reportedly, both the price formula and price levels were changed, and Gazprom also 
decreased TOP levels (Gazprom eyes new Hungarian deal, 2014, p. 6). Without these concessions, the 
government’s utility rate cut policy would hardly be sustainable even in the medium run. Paradoxically, 
in the case of energy price populism, the EU is more of an enemy and Russia is a potential ally for many 
decision-makers.
 Not surprisingly, major international companies such E.ON, GDF and RWE have been leaving the 
sector. The state-owned Electricity Works (MVM) and more recently the National Public Utility Com-
pany have taken over their positions. MVM purchased the wholesaler and the gas storage companies 
from E.ON in 2013, and foreign firms have exited from the retail sector more recently. Consequently, 
65 The EC has already launched an investigation into certain discriminatory practices related to favourable electricity and 
gas pricing for households (Kapitulál…, 2015).
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gas negotiations with Russia have again become increasingly politicised, and Viktor Orbán is person-
ally engaged on this issue. Today, Hungary has an unprofitable gas sector, where price increases are 
not tolerated politically and the state is forced to subsidise the sector in a manner that is hidden from 
the European Commission.
 The nuclear deal on the Paks expansion further increases uncertainty with respect to Hungarian-
Russian energy relations. The contract came out of the blue, with no serious discussions having taken 
place prior to the January 2014 Orbán-Putin agreement. Notwithstanding, the replacement of the four 
existing VVER blocks at Paks, which deliver almost half of Hungary’s electricity, constitutes one of 
the greatest challenges for Hungarian energy policy. This contract offers more questions than answers, 
however: the new blocks would be commissioned as early as the mid-2020s; the timing of the signing 
just three months before the elections was highly risky for Fidesz; and almost all regulatory issues, 
especially those related to the EU, were neglected, leaving these questions unanswered. The project 
also lacks quasi-consensual political support, and in its current form also economic and policy justifi-
cation. It will certainly cause major tensions with the European Commission’s Directorate General for 
Competition, and given the EUR 10 billion Russian credit line (approximately 10% of Hungary’s GDP), 
the contracts constitute by far the single largest budget item in the bilateral relationship. 
7. Waiting for Godot – pipeline projects and Hungary
Hungary inherited an unfavourable gas supply situation from the 1990s. Gas imports constituted 
a very high, almost 35% share of Total Primary Energy Supply (TPES), and almost all natural gas 
came exclusively from Russia and through Ukraine. The country was a dead end for suppliers, as no 
major transit quantities crossed Hungary. The network was able to weather the 2009 gas crisis only 
due to its relatively large reserves. All this led to a relatively early notion of insecurity and elaboration 
of interconnectivity and pipeline projects. These included the New European Transmission System 
(NETS) project proposed by MOL, an attempt to integrate regional networks and build new intercon-
nectors in the mid-2000s, and the Nabucco project, designed to bring Middle Eastern and Caspian gas 
to the region. Russia joined this contest with the South Stream project already in 2006, and its entry 
was hailed by Hungary’s incumbent Socialist-liberal government.
 Despite its harsh criticism of South Stream in opposition, Fidesz had changed sides by 2013 and 
was a forceful advocate of the Russian pipeline. The fiasco with Nabucco-West in 2012 further accel-
erated this process, and left the Russian project as the only one on the negotiating table. After the 
cancellation of South Stream in early 2015, Hungary elaborated – allegedly not independently of 
behind-the-scenes Russian suggestions – the Tesla pipeline from Greece to Hungary through Macedo-
nia and Serbia. This project is merely another addition to the broad set of pipeline options in the SEE 
region, including Slovak-led Eastring and EU-proposed Gas Ring. These are competitive proposals, 
and Budapest would like to remain a policy shaper on this issue. The Hungarian government is keen to 
bring transit to the country and fears being left out if any of these pipelines are built. It thus keeps the 
Russian connection alive, because Moscow is still perceived as a major policy-maker in these pipeline 
projects.
 Russian pipeline projects remain attractive predominantly as a  bargaining chip in gas supply 
talks. They also enhance contractual diversity, potentially providing access to other importers’ con-
tracted gas volumes. Furthermore, Hungarian policy-makers are hoping for better utilisation of 
their idle storage capacities (total storage is above 6 bcm, more than twice the average domestic 
need for annual seasonal balancing). Supply security and managing Ukrainian transit risks consti-
tute a common interest with Gazprom, while investments as such are of particular interest for the 
cabinet. Revenues from South Stream transit fees would have comprised 0.2% of GDP (Lecture by 
Csaba Kiss, 2014), a considerable amount, albeit much less than in the SEE countries (in Bulgaria it 
would have been around 2%).
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 Although Hungarian pipeline policies are often characterised as Russia-friendly, this assessment 
is not fully justified. As a result of so many disappointments, the record of pipeline- and EU intercon-
nectivity projects is relatively limited in Budapest. In view of the many different and competitive, but 
unrealised proposals, including those from Russia, most domestic stakeholders approach any project 
with caution and circumspection. Russia is still perceived as a key policy-maker in this respect, but its 
credibility in this area is rather limited as there is currently no major EU project on the table.
8. A reluctant member – attitudes towards European energy 
policies
In general, Hungary approaches EU energy policies with a CEE mind-set and some national peculiari-
ties. Interests are concentrated around energy security and social affordability issues, while competi-
tiveness and climate change take the back seat among the country’s priorities. Accordingly, price and 
transit issues are strongly represented, while liberalisation, renewables and energy efficiency poli-
cies are almost completely absent from the national agenda. The country traditionally coordinates its 
actions closely with its Visegrad partners, although Budapest has started to form its own agenda 
on particular issues. The extensive use of administrative utility pricing and its Russia-friendly stance 
cause the most tension with the European Commission. In this latter regard, the Paks expansion and 
the issue of reverse gas flows to Ukraine are of particular interest.66
 Hungary had practically completed its gas interconnectivity and security programme by 2013, 
much earlier than its neighbours. Interconnectors with all neighbouring states except Slovenia were 
constructed. Despite all the controversies, Hungary was the first to raise the issue of Ukrainian reverse 
flows at the corporate level as early as 2012. As far as EU security policies are concerned, Hunga-
ry’s performance is rather good, despite all the political disturbances. Indeed, it is Budapest that has 
shown some dissatisfaction with the European Commission’s downsizing of regional security efforts. 
According to European gas stress tests, Hungary is in the “secure” category, a classification which 
sounds very doubtful among Hungarian policy-makers. Attitudes were also sceptical of the European 
Commission’s regulatory behaviour in the EU-Russia conflict around South Stream, as many policy-
makers found the DG Energy’s approach too rigid and inflexible. Like so many other potential transit 
states, Hungary would have preferred a compromise between Brussels and Moscow.
9. The Energy Union and Orbán – an uneasy welcome
Viktor Orbán has given conflicting assessments of the published Energy Union concept. In certain 
interviews, he has praised it, while on other occasions he has characterised it as unacceptable, con-
tending that it further limits national sovereignty over energy policies (Orbán says…, 2015; Orbán at 
Visegrad 4…, 2015). Obviously, the initiative is too complex and at too early a stage to provide a com-
prehensive assessment. Most regulators and corporate actors have been waiting for the final legal 
drafts. In the light of Hungary’s past reactions and current energy policy record, it may be reasonable 
to expect a calm and highly restrained welcome coupled with loud criticism by Viktor Orbán personally. 
 The Energy Union concept refers to a broad range of potential measures, and consequently opens 
up room for compromises between member states. Like many other CEE states, Hungary supports 
diversification and infrastructure development projects from the common budget, since the country is 
a net beneficiary of these transfers. The government has a mixed attitude towards proposals related 
66 Hungary suspended reverse flows temporarily in September 2014.
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to climate change: primarily because of the Paks expansion project, it supports the increased carbon 
reduction target (40% by 2030), while it opposes the 27% renewable target. The most controversy 
may come from efforts to increase transparency, stricter implementation of measures under the third 
package, the new responsibilities of the regulator ACER, and new legislation concerning nuclear fuels 
and projects. All these measures would further limit the role of national jurisdiction and delegate 
competencies to common institutions. Hungary certainly will strive to keep its sovereignty untouched, 
opposing most of these new potential limitations.
10. Shipping and cutting – the case of reverse gas flows to 
Ukraine
Hungary played a positive role in establishing the physical and regulatory framework for reverse 
gas flows to Ukraine. Unlike Slovakia and like Poland, the Hungarian pipeline operator (FGSZ) ini-
tially had a dedicated, empty pipeline between the two countries. This capacity induced FGSZ to 
start reverse supplies without formally requesting Gazprom’s approval or investing additional funds 
into the network. Since FGSZ had long been advocating for Ukrainian reverse flow, the Hungarian 
Regulatory Office established an exit point and allowed its capacity to be auctioned in spring 2013, 
just after the Polish reverse supplies started. The utilisation rate was relatively low, far below the 
technical limits. Constraints mainly came from Ukrainian national oil and gas company Naftohaz, 
and involved cheaper access to Russian or Slovak supplies, or a lack of funds in the Ukrainian budget. 
More recently, in June 2015, FGSZ and Naftohaz agreed to upgrade the interconnector’s regula-
tory standards in order to comply with EU requirements. This is the first action of its kind among 
CEE-Ukraine border capacities; it is strongly opposed by Gazprom and has been welcomed by the 
Energy Community.
 In September 2014, Budapest temporarily stopped reverse flows citing technical reasons, and 
increased import demand for Hungarian storage. From a legal point of view, FGSZ had the right to do 
this, as reverse flows were contractually interruptible. Technical data did not justify this action, how-
ever, as ample free capacity had been present in the successive period. It is more likely that Alexey Mill-
er’s meeting with Viktor Orbán just three days prior to this statement played a role in the gas export 
suspension. Gazprom publicly condemned the existing system of reverse flows to Ukraine and con-
tracted Hungarian storage capacity for the winter period. Supposedly, the move had been prompted 
by the Hungarian side requesting Gazprom to fill the storage capacity, since MVM lacked the neces-
sary funds. Reverse flows were resumed after Vladimir Putin’s visit in February 2015. This short epi-
sode aptly demonstrated the duality of the issue: FGSZ, owned by MOL, is financially interested and 
strongly advocates reverse flows, while the government maintains hidden control and uses it according 
to its volatile preferences.
11. Hungary at a crossroads? – a rational or “Russian all” 
energy policy
From the description above, it is obvious that Hungarian-Russian relations are not balanced and that 
Hungary is on the vulnerable end of the string. In the trade balance, the Russian portion is much larger 
and energy carriers or energy-related suppliers constitute a massive portion of the inflow of goods. 
Hungary thus depends on Russia to a great deal in terms of its energy production. The current official 
energy strategy thus states very clearly that Russia is Hungary’s most important partner in this con-
nection, but also states that this one-sided dependence should be eased (National Energy Strategy 
2030, 2012, p. 27).
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 At this point, we need to understand that everything that would make Hungary less dependent on 
Russian resources and less vulnerable to Russian political turns has nothing to do with Russia. The 
measures or policies or technologies that would make Hungary less reliant, more independent and self-
sufficient, flexible and stronger in the context of energy – i.e. the things that would strengthen Hun-
gary’s bargaining position – are independent of any Russian relations. Energy efficiency and renewable 
technology after all are not the strongest part of the Russian economy. To be clear, the Hungarian 
government would not need the consent of the Russian president to launch a massive energy efficiency 
programme, or to strengthen the weak renewable feed-in tariff. The postponement of or failure to 
implement sustainable energy measures during the last decade has thus helped to create a situation 
in which Hungarian energy policy is much more defenceless against the Russian energy industry that 
it otherwise would have been. And we can add that the quality of the energy policy and governmental 
actions in this area has worsened significantly over the past five years.
 This is the reason why the remainder of this chapter will focus less on Russian gas deals, the vari-
ous potential routes for pipelines and the details of the new Russia-financed nuclear power plant, and 
much more on what has distorted the Hungarian energy market and on actions not taken in the past. 
These actions would have been the fundaments and the bases of Hungarian energy security, and would 
have resulted in further benefits as well, but the environment and the economic reality are not really 
among the current government’s concerns. (To be fair, however, the environment has never been a con-
cern of any Hungarian government.) These measures are the relevant, effective, expected and agreed 
actions of an EU member state. More significantly, however, we must underscore that these measures 
– enhancing efficiency and the uptake of renewable technologies – would have been rational actions in 
Hungary not because of its commitments to the EU, but because of Hungary’s own interest.
 Why are experts convinced that these are rational actions? To answer this question, we need to 
re-examine the characteristics of Hungary’s energy market as well as recent developments in energy 
policy. Based on this, we can make an informed judgment about the situation and the Hungarian gov-
ernment’s preparedness and ability to cope with it.
Several facts, major trends and developments are worth repeating as bullet points:
 limited conventional energy sources and reserves;
 major imports from Russia in oil (85%), natural gas (79%) and nuclear fuel (100%) in 2012 (Mem-
ber States’ Energy Dependence…, 2013);
 in terms of oil, the Hungarian import structure is among the most concentrated in the EU 
(Member States’ Energy Dependence…, 2013);
 Hungary had one of the highest shares of gas in the energy mix among EU countries in 2010; 
the household sector is very dependent on natural gas (70% of household use this source of 
energy one way or another);
 solid fuel/lignite constitutes only a limited share of the energy supply (11%), although with respect 
to this source Hungary is in a relatively strong position in terms of dependency compared to the EU 
average;
 Hungary’s storage capacity for natural gas is enormous compared to national consumption;
 Hungary’s geopolitical position is very beneficial for long-term energy flows through the country;
 Hungary has a huge and unexploited energy efficiency potential67 – in the household sector alone, 
the economic energy savings potential is 15% of the country’s total primary energy supply;
 Hungary has a huge and unexploited renewable potential; in 2013, the share of renewables was 
around 10% of gross final energy consumption (Share of renewables…, 2015) and the target for 
2020 is 14.61%; both Hungary’s current share and its official target are in the lower third among 
EU countries;
67 Everything you want to know about Hungary’s energy efficiency potential is at Energiaklub’s NegaJoule website: http://
negajoule.eu/en.
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 Hungary has new cross-border infrastructure with EU member states and other neighbouring 
countries (for both natural gas and electricity).
The European Commission’s last report on European energy dependence (Member States’ Energy 
Dependence…, 2013) concludes that Hungary has total energy import dependence in line with the 
EU average, but its high energy intensity contributes to its high energy trade deficit. It is important 
to note that the high overall energy intensity originates from the transport sector and more impor-
tantly the household sector. Increasing the country’s current low level of renewable energy produc-
tion while improving energy efficiency would reduce Hungary’s energy trade deficit. Furthermore, 
given the very high proportion of Russian gas in its energy mix, alternative, potentially cheaper (in 
light of the recent fall in global natural gas prices) gas supplies could also reduce the energy trade 
deficit.
 We can thus conclude that one of the eminent aims of Hungarian foreign policy and energy policy 
should have been to decrease this dependence. The solution to this problem is not rocket science. The 
above-mentioned report and many other documents, as well as Hungary’s energy strategy and inter-
national commitments, all include and refer to increasing the use of local resources through: a) energy 
efficiency, b) renewables, and c) diversification of natural gas routes.
 What is really striking here is that the last of these options usually receives much more attention 
from decision-makers, the media and experts. Diversification of gas pipelines – as recent examples 
show – is a risky business. Governments, state-owned and private companies, institutions and diplo-
matic circles can spend years negotiating a deal and suddenly a new development or an announcement 
by Gazprom or President Putin can scuttle the whole plan. 
 By contrast, developing domestic resources, lowering domestic demand through smart measures 
and innovative financing options, and systematically building up the capacity of new technologies as 
well the confidence and trust of investors – this strategy is entirely in the hands of national govern-
ments. It requires persistence, commitment and a  certain amount of creativity – and the fruits of 
these efforts admittedly cannot be harvested in a fortnight – but this strategy certainly has a greater 
likelihood of effectively influencing the national energy market and the various players in this area than 
the foreign policy manoeuvres of a small European country trying to influence Middle Eastern energy 
moguls, the Russian government and/or Russian energy companies, or of having any impact on global 
energy prices as such.
 With this in mind, how can we characterise the Orbán government’s energy policy?
 One major effort is obvious and has been well communicated: providing cheap energy to the people. 
The favourable deals with Putin on natural gas and construction of a new nuclear power plant are said 
to be the underlying fundaments of this goal, but most energy policy experts would consider this to be 
rather misleading propaganda.
 Let us examine what has happened and what has not happened in the name of this tunnel-vision 
policy goal. 
12. Household energy bills cut
This is a commonly used weapon in the post-Soviet bloc, and Orbán played this card well, winning the 
general elections again in 2014. As indicated above, cutting household utility prices is a misleading 
measure even if we assume that there had initially been some room such reductions. The policy started 
at the end of 2012, and by now it should be obvious that this has caused market distortions in the form 
of cross-financing between the household and industrial sectors. Recently, new announcements have 
been made, and a further decrease is anticipated. An additional government-imposed decrease in the 
household sector will increase cross-financing and thus raise energy costs for industry, worsening Hun-
gary’s competiveness.
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 This is also a mentally, socially and politically problematic issue, as consumers are led to believe 
that the prime minister can set energy prices at will. There is also an institutional problem here: the 
integrity and accountability of the Hungarian administration and in particular the Hungarian energy 
regulator which had to prepare and implement the new rate system. This market distortion created 
an unpredictable business environment for international energy companies (E.ON, RWE, EDF, etc.), 
which induced them to halt operations and even to relinquish capital investments in order to escape 
from the country. All told, this sole measure will have a very long-lasting negative impact not only on 
energy policy, but also on the trust of major investors and multinational companies. It will take a tre-
mendous effort, political marketing and a strong course of action to regain this trust.
13. A new Russian nuclear power plant
Following the manipulation of energy prices, the construction of a new nuclear power plant was intro-
duced as a cornerstone of cheap energy and energy security. The new power plant, if ultimately con-
structed and brought online, will generate electricity at a much higher price than the European and 
Hungarian electricity systems produce today or would otherwise produce in the coming decades (Fels-
mann, 2015), thus making the entire Hungarian energy system more costly and raising prices for end 
users. Alternately, if the capital costs of the plant are not included in electricity prices, as the Hungar-
ian prime minister suggested while explaining the origin of cheap electricity, then these costs will fall 
to taxpayers.
 In terms of energy security, it is very difficult to verify that tying Hungary to Russia with an addi-
tional string will make the country’s energy situation more resilient. In fact, just the opposite is true.
 The Russian-Hungarian nuclear deal is at least as important as the natural gas business between 
the two countries, if not more so, and – although this has been denied – it could be the case that the two 
agreements go hand in hand. The new nuclear deal further ties Hungary to the Russian sphere of influ-
ence in multiple ways. The plant is to be financed, constructed and supplied with fuel68 by the Russians, 
and they will also treat the spent fuel.
 Since the announcement of this deal, there has been no answer to the obvious question of why this 
agreement was so urgent and signed several months before the elections. Politically, it was a very risky 
move for Viktor Orbán, since any major business with Russia leaves a bad taste in the mouths of Fidesz 
supporters. The list of questions is much longer than this, however, and there have been no reasonable 
answers on practically any of the basic issues, and no responses or compelling arguments have been 
offered in respect of any of the concerns raised.
 We now know that the price per kilowatt-hour of electricity from this plant will be much higher than 
the government has communicated thus far. We also know that the European Commission will conduct 
a  thorough inspection of whether or not this deal and the financial component of the construction 
involve illegal state aid. This will obviously impact the Russians, for whom the construction of a nuclear 
power plant within the borders of the EU is a prestigious project. The Russian state will finance it, 
build it, and supply the fuel for it at least initially. Although Euratom’s institutions have significantly 
shortened the term of the original contract on the supply of fuel, the spent fuel will also be taken care 
of by the Russian nuclear industry. The Russians will thus control the whole cycle.
 In addition to all the above-mentioned problems connected with the construction of Paks II, the 
project also constitutes a huge obstacle to the future development of sustainable energy in Hungary. 
Given the country’s size and GDP, an investment of this magnitude into a single project will have the 
practical effect of blocking all the capital flow into other areas of energy production.
68 The Euratom Supply Agency has reduced the guaranteed and contracted period during which Russian fuel producers will 
the principal suppliers, however (Euratom signs off…, 2015).
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14. Energy efficiency first
As has already been stated, energy efficiency is the first and most important aspect of energy policy for 
many reasons. It makes the whole economy less energy-intensive, less dependent on outside resources 
and more competitive, and it improves housing conditions, which results in fewer health issues connected 
to poor living conditions. Investments in energy efficiency would create a huge number of jobs all over the 
country, and would require people with more education and training. And the list goes on with beneficial 
environmental and budgetary impacts, as well as a positive, long-term effect on the trade balance.
 It seems that Fidesz understood this in the run-up to the elections, and a substantial portion of 
the campaign was devoted to new energy efficiency schemes and government-supported financial pro-
grammes. Since then, however, practically nothing has happened in this area, and the utility rate cuts 
have halted even these investments in the household sector, which otherwise probably would have been 
made even without any governmental support scheme. There were no effective information campaigns, 
awareness-raising programmes or financial incentives, and even the building code and regulations of 
renovations were not strengthened to a reasonable level, let alone to an optimal level. These were basi-
cally a series of non-actions that caused a significant backlash in the construction industry, already 
severely impacted by the economic crisis.
 The promises and the small amount of short-lived financial support provided by the government 
over the last five years have probably resulted in more damage than benefit. They created a very hectic 
situation in the market, forcing industry to react very quickly to these small, campaign-like support 
schemes. They had to hire and then lay off workers from among the ranks of those who had remained in 
the country after the outbreak of the crisis. At the same time, many households postponed their invest-
ments while waiting for new support schemes that never materialised.
 Altogether, the Hungarian government has acted as if it would like to sabotage or block any major 
progress in this area. They must know that energy efficiency is slowly creeping into all spheres of 
energy consumption, and that it would be much better to direct this development than to suddenly be 
confronted by a decline in demand that would render unnecessary much of the investment in the natu-
ral gas network, for example. They must know that in the household sector alone such projects would 
save 15% of the country’s total primary energy demand, which is actually equivalent to the output of 
the existing Paks Nuclear Power Plant.
15. Renewables – “the sun never shines at night”
This is a classic quotation from László L. Simon, previous head of the parliament’s cultural committee. 
“What are we going to do if the wind doesn’t blow and the sun is not shining? We still need electricity.” 
(Nem lehet csak naperőmű…, 2014)
 This is the level of understanding of energy policy among MPs and even the government’s top deci-
sion-makers. They must be aware, however, that surveys show the Hungarian public have a much bet-
ter understanding of this issue and support the development of renewable energy sources – they would 
laugh at such a statement.
 Hungary has huge and unexploited potential for wind, solar, geothermal and biomass energy. 
According to Energiaklub’s latest modelling effort (Sáfián, 2015), the country could function very well 
in 2030 without a new nuclear power plant but with cogeneration partly based on biomass, 2,800 MW 
of wind capacity and 1,400 MW of solar. This would produce 27% of Hungary’s electricity consump-
tion in 2030. This scenario necessitates many new investments and infrastructure upgrades, but these 
need not involve that much state financing if better legislation and governance are in place. It would 
also provide many more jobs in a far wider geographic area than is envisaged in the official energy plan, 
which contains basically a single project: Paks II.
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 The government’s attitude is obviously much more hostile towards this area of policy and invest-
ment. The new Fidesz government’s first move in 2010 was to withdraw the announcement of “win-
ners” in the 440 MW wind tendering, which was in the final stage at that point. No explanation or 
reason was given. Subsequently, the government announced that it would reshape the feed-in tariff 
system, but then the process was suddenly halted right after it had begun and has never been resumed. 
The government is keeping the entire industry in this extra-legal position. Occasionally, there is a new 
episode in the form of an unprecedented levy on solar installations, as was the case in early 2015.
16. Conclusions: a big no to sustainability
From the above, we can conclude that Orbán’s government does not want to see sustainable energy 
compete with nuclear power, and at the same time wishes to buy votes with the promise of ever-
decreasing energy prices. Most of the energy business is characterised by non-transparency and state 
secrecy (e.g. MET and Paks II), which implies a strong possibility of corruption. The Hungarian gov-
ernment does not want to see wind turbines or solar panels on the roofs of residential houses through-
out the country, and has not made it advantageous to farmers to transform their residual agricultural 
materials into biogas. The government does not want people and industry to save energy, even though 
this is the cheapest energy source for the coming decades.
 At the same time, for unknown reasons, the Hungarian government wants to build a  taxpayer-
funded nuclear power plant that would totally distort the Hungarian energy market and tie the country 
to Russia in additional ways. This energy policy is not based on evidence, research and rational reason-
ing. Rather, it is based on unrealistic assumptions and old, retrograde reflexes from Soviet times: the 
state needs to build power plants and to own the energy industry in order to control energy prices and 
provide cheap energy to the people at all costs. And the Russian state and state-owned companies are 
good at serving this type of energy policy; this is the policy they understand and can work with.
 As has already been stated, energy efficiency and renewable energy seemingly do not have any-
thing to do with Russia, but the fact that Hungary is not building on these diverse and innovative tech-
nologies determines the direction of energy development and ties the country even more tightly to an 
old-fashioned empire that wishes to keep the “conquered” nations in a vulnerable position. The main 
problem is that the Hungarian government is assisting in this effort.
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